Τετάρτη 12/10/2011

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Χτες το πρωί ο ΜΒ και ΣΜ είχαν μια συζήτηση... Αυτή τη συζήτηση ο ΜΒ την αποτύπωσε σε ένα κείμενο...και ο ΣΜ αποφάσισε ότι ήθελε να το συνυπογράψει...

Η απο- νεύρωση του συστήματος, των  Μανώλη Βαρδή και Σεραφείμ Μακρή || www.democracycrisis.com

«Οίδα σου τα έργα ότι ούτε ψυχρός εί ούτε ζεστός, όφελον ψυχρός ής ή ζεστός, ούτως ότι χλιαρός ει και ούτε ζεστός ούτε ψυχρός, μέλλω σε εμέσαι εκ του στόματός μου» (Αποκ. Γ΄15).

Τελικά μερικά λόγια είναι όντως αιώνια. Πως μου ήλθε τώρα το ευαγγελικό;

Παρακολούθησα τη Δευτέρα το βράδυ στο ΣΚΑΪ -ΔΝΤ την εκπομπή του Παπαχελά με καλεσμένο τον Χρύσανθο Λαζαρίδη. Τον Χρύσανθο γενικά τον παρακολουθώ εδώ και καιρό. Πιστεύω ότι έχει καλό λόγο και μία, ξεχασμένη από πολλούς νεοέλληνες, αίσθηση της γεωπολιτικής. Μου έκανε λοιπόν κατάπληξη πως ο (τουλάχιστον παμπόνηρος) Παπαχελάς τον «στρίμωξε»!

Ήταν solo Παπαχελά. Ήταν on the screen διαπραγμάτευση/ βολιδοσκόπηση της επόμενης κυβέρνησης. Στην τηλεοπτική, μετα- μοντέρνα μας δημοκρατία η κυβέρνηση πρώτα διαπιστεύεται στα κέντρα εξουσίας, και μετά βγαίνει από τις εκλογές. Εξού και τα περί antinews και κουκουλοφόρων στο τέλος. Εξού και η επανάληψη της αποστροφής Σαμαρά κατά των «συντεχνιών» που τόσο χαροποίησε τους δημοσιογράφους του στο ΣΚΑΪ -ΔΝΤ.

Η (πραγματική) εξουσία πριν προχωρήσει στην καθαυτό «εγχείριση», απονευρώνει το επίμαχο νεύρο. Η ομάδα Λαζαρίδη είναι μειοψηφία στη ΝΔ, και αυτό το ξέρει ο γιατρός. Επίσης ο γιατρός ξέρει (τί γιατρός θα ήταν άλλωστε;) ότι ένα μεγάλο τμήμα του κοινωνικού συνόλου, από το οποίο επιζητεί ψήφους ένα κόμμα εξουσίας, δεν «χαλιέται» από το Μνημόνιο. Ίσως μόνο από την «κακή εφαρμογή του» (γιατί γι’ αυτούς υπάρχει και καλή!). Οπότε ο καλός μας Λαζαρίδης βρέθηκε να υπερασπίζεται αμήχανα (και ένας που γνωρίζει τη ρητορική του δεινότητα, εύκολα το καταλαβαίνει) τη μεσοβέζικη ή χλιαρή άποψη του ναι μεν αλλά. Ναι στους στόχους του Μνημονίου, αλλά με ανάπτυξη. Ναι στην εφεδρεία, αλλά όχι με απολύσεις. Μείωση φορολογίας και αξιοποίηση της δημόσιας περιουσίας (σχέδιο ΕΥΡΗΚΑ;).

Όλα αυτά έχουν περισσότερη αξία για την εξουσία εάν προέρχονται από τον Λαζαρίδη παρά από τον Αβραμόπουλο ή τον Χατζηγάκη. Ευνόητο!

Η κρίση είναι τέτοια και ο αγώνας επιβίωσης της χώρας τέτοιου μεγέθους που χλιαρότητες δεν χωρούν. Ή είσαι με το Μνημόνιο εξ’ αρχής ή βάλλεις εκποδών την Τρόϊκα. Δεν διαπραγματεύεσαι με το «Διάβολο». Γιατί είναι πιο δυνατός από εσένα (εκτός αν είσαι Χριστός, που και Αυτός δεν διαπραγματεύτηκε!)

Δυστυχώς, η αμηχανία Λαζαρίδη και το όλο concept δείχνουν και κάτι άλλο: oτι ακόμα και η πιο ριζοσπαστική μερίδα ενός κόμματος εξουσίας όταν κληθεί ν’ αναμετρηθεί με το αποχαυνωμένο και ραγιάδικο πόπολο, αναγκαστικά θα βάλει νερό στο κρασί της.

Έτσι ήταν πάντοτε στην Ιστορία. Οι μεγάλοι ηγέτες θέλουν μεγάλους λαούς και τούμπαλιν. Σε κάθε άλλη περίπτωση κάνει πάρτι ο Παπαχελάς (και καλά κάνει). Γι’ αυτό και οι υπογράφοντες έχουν πολλές φορές διαμηνύσει ότι το όλο πρόβλημα είναι μόνο συγκυριακά πολιτικό ή οικονομικό. Είναι πρωτίστως κοινωνικό και ανθρωπολογικό. Με «πυξίδες ζωής» σαν αυτές όλων μας, δεν μπορεί να περιμένει κανείς πολλά πράγματα.

Είπαμε, ραντεβού στην Κόλαση!

Για την παγκοσμιοποίηση και το διεθνιστικό ταξικό αγώνα ρε γαμώτο!

«Ἀσπαζόμεθα τὴν ἱερὰν γῆν τῆς Ἐλευθέρας Πατρίδος... Οἱ Βάρβαροι, ἀφοῦ ἔβεβήλωσαν, ἐπυρπόλησαν καὶ ἐδήωσαν, ἐπὶ τρία καὶ ἥμισυ ἔτη, πιεζόμενοι πλέον ἀπὸ τὴν συμμαχικὴν νίκην καὶ τὴν ἐθνικήν μας ἀντίστασιν τρέπονται εἰς φυγήν. Καὶ ἡ Κυανόλευκος κυματίζει μόνη εἰς τὴν Ἀκρόπολιν...

Ἀπὸ τὰ βάθη τῆς Ἱστορίας οἱ ἑλληνικοὶ αἰῶνες πανηγυρίζουν τὴν ἐπάνοδον τῆς Ἐλευθερίας εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν Πατρίδα της. Καὶ στεφανώνουν τὴν Γενεάν μας. Διότι ὁλόκληρος ὁ Λαός μας ὑπῆρξεν ἀγωνιστὴς τῆς Ἐλευθερίας. Δὲν εὑρίσκεται ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν κατεχομένην Εὐρώπην ἄλλο παράδειγμα τόσης καθολικῆς ἀντιστάσεως καὶ τόσης ἀκλονήτου αἰσιοδοξίας διὰ τὴν τελικὴν Νίκην.

Ἀλλὰ πρὸς Σὲ περισσότερον, Λαὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, Λαὲ τῆς περιφερείας τῆς Πρωτευούσης, ἀνήκει ὁ ἐθνικὸς ἔπαινος. Ἐδῶ ἐπάλλετο ἡ ἀδάμαστος καρδία τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Ἐδῶ ἦσαν εὐτυχεῖς ὅσοι ἐπροκινδύνευαν καὶ κατεθλίβοντο, ὅσοι δὲν εἶχαν τὴν εὐκαιρίαν νὰ κινδυνεύσουν...

Καὶ πρός Σᾶς, Νέοι καὶ Νέαι, ἐκφράζομεν τὸν θαυμασμόν μας. Εἴχατε μεταβάλει εἰς καθημερινὴν συνήθειαν τὴν πρόκλησιν τοῦ ἐχθροῦ καὶ τὴν περιφρόνησιν τοῦ θανάτου. Ἐμπρὸς εἰς τὰ στόμια τῶν πολυβόλων του ἐζητωκραυγάζατε τὴν Ἑλλάδα!

Ὁλόκληρος ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς Λαὸς ἔχει καταστῆ ἄξιος τῆς Πατρίδος. Μὲ τὸ πέρασμα τῶν καιρῶν, εἰς τὸ περίλαμπρον ἔπος τῆς Ἀλβανίας θὰ προστεθῆ καὶ ὁ μῦθος τῆς καθολικῆς ἀντιστάσεως...
( Γεώργιος Παπανδρέου, Ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀπελευθερώσεως, Ἀθῆναι, 18 Ὀκτωβρίου 1944)

The effectiveness of fiscal and monetary stimulus in depressions, by Miguel Almunia,Agustín S. Bénétrix,Barry Eichengreen,Kevin H. O’Rourke and Gisela Rua, www.voxeu.org 18/09/2011

The debate over the effectiveness of stimulus rages on (Barro and Redlick 2009). Fewer than two years of data – that being the amount of time since monetary and fiscal measures to counter the crisis were put in place – are not enough to pin down the effects. And different theoretical models, for better or worse, predict different results. Strongly held priors rule the roost.

There is, however, one important source of information on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal stimulus in an environment of near-zero interest rates, dysfunctional banking systems and heightened risk aversion that has not been fully exploited: the 1930s. This column – based on a paper presented at the 50th Economic Policy Panel Meeting held in Tilburg on 23-24 October 2009 – draws out some of the lessons for today’s crisis (Almunia et al. 2009).

Parallels: the Great Depression and the Great Recession

In previous columns, two of us documented the strong parallels between the early stages of the Great Depression and the early stages of our Great Recession. The causes of the two episodes were quite similar. In the earlier episode they included an unsustainable real estate boom (centred in Florida), lax supervision and regulation, and global imbalances (known then as “the transfer problem”). Similar circumstances suggest similar effects of policy, whether positive, negative or none.

The problem is that the policy response then was limited. The Keynesian argument for expansionary fiscal policy – whether right or wrong – was not known in this pre-Keynesian era. Hence there was relatively little variation in fiscal stance, with conservative policies being the default option. The aggressive use of discretionary monetary policy was also relatively unusual, as central banks were wedded to gold-standard ideology.

But there were exceptions. Japan’s aggressive use of monetary policy under Takahashi was one, Italy’s large budget deficits under Mussolini another. And there were good – exogenous – reasons for this variation. Fiscal impulses were generally governed by forces other than immediate economic conditions; Italy’s war in present-day Ethiopia, Hitler’s rearmament, the approach of World War II. Who responded to the crisis with monetary stimulus depended heavily on prior monetary experience; counties that had suffered high inflation in the 1920s tended to be reluctant to abandon the gold standard in the 1930s.

New research

Cross-country comparisons can thus help us untie the Gordian Knot and move the debate from the realm of ideology to that of evidence. Our project therefore focuses on assembling annual data on growth, budgets and central bank policy rates, mainly from League of Nations sources, for 27 countries covering the period 1925-39.

This leaves the question of what model or empirical technique to apply. Rather than prejudging the answer, we employ a battery of empirical methods. We use panel vector autoregressions (VARs) with conventional assumptions about the “ordering” of the variables (whether a variable affects the others contemporaneously or only with a lag). We consider alternative orderings, and also run panel VARs with defence expenditure entering the equations as an exogenous variable. We run panel instrumental variables regressions using defence spending as an instrument for fiscal policy and gold standard membership as an instrument for monetary policy. And we run alternative panel regressions looking at the impact of fiscal and monetary shocks, the latter calculated by running simple autoregressions and extracting the residuals.

Where tried, fiscal policy was effective in the 1930s

The details of the results differ, but the overall conclusions do not. They show that where fiscal policy was tried, it was effective.

Our estimates of its short-run effects are at the upper end of those estimated recently with modern data; the multiplier is as large as 2 in the first year, before declining significantly in subsequent years. (Figure 1 shows this in the case of the panel VAR estimates with the conventional ordering assumptions.) This is, in fact, what one should expect if one believes that the effectiveness of fiscal policy is greatest when interest rates are at the zero bound, leading to little crowding out of private spending. It is what one should expect when households are credit constrained by a dysfunctional banking system. Given similar circumstances in 2008, this underscores the advantages of using 1930s data as a source of evidence on the effects of current policy.

Figure 1. Impulse response functions, shock to defence spending (1% of GDP)

Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the impulse-response mean. Dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates defence spending (G), GDP (Y), revenues (T) and central bank discount rate (R). Each equation in the system includes country fixed effects, country-specific linear trends and year dummies.

Other methodologies may yield somewhat smaller fiscal multipliers. But the message is the same.

Monetary policy in the 1930s was not powerless

The results for monetary policy are less robust but point in the same direction. A positive shock to the central bank discount rate leads to a fall in GDP (Figure 2). The fall in output just misses statistical significance at conventional levels (that is, the confidence bands just barely span the horizontal line denoting no change.) Under alternative assumptions about the ordering of the variables, however (Figure 3), the direction of the effect is the same, and this time it is significant.

Figure 2. Impulse response functions, shock to discount rate

Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the impulse-response mean. Dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates defence spending (G), GDP (Y), revenues (T) and central bank discount rate (R). Each equation in the system includes country fixed effects, country-specific linear trends and year dummies.

Figure 3. Impulse response functions, shock to discount rate (alternative ordering)

Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the impulse-response mean. Dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates defence spending (G), GDP (Y), revenues (T) and central bank discount rate (R). Each equation in the system includes country fixed effects, country-specific linear trends and year dummies.

This result is notable, given the presumption, widespread in the literature, that monetary policy is ineffective in near-zero-interest-rate (liquidity trap) conditions. On the contrary, in the 1930s it appears that accommodating monetary policy helped, by transforming deflationary expectations (Temin and Wigmore 1990) and by helping to mend broken banking systems (Bernanke and James 1991). Given the prevalence of both problems circa 2008, we suspect that the results carry over.

For others with different priors, these results may sit less easily. But the time for priors is over. Policy should rest on an evidentiary basis. The evidence we have marshalled so far speaks clearly.

Τι παίζεται; του Γιάννη Βαρουφάκη, 12/10/2011, www.protagon.gr

Who signed Anwar al-Awlaki’s death warrant?, by Richard Cohen, The Washingtron Post, 11/10/2011

A little “yippee” emitted from me when I heard the news. Awlaki was a traitor to his country and its values. He was allegedly a senior recruiter for al-Qaeda and was linked to the Fort Hood shooting suspect Nidal Malik Hasan as well as other attempted terror acts. Awlaki was not shy about his activities, and so they, not to mention his allegiance, were not in question.

There was a question, though, about what to do with him. The Constitution is persnickety about due process, the right to a trial and so on. Awlaki’s citizenship seemed to complicate matters, although in the view of some it should not have. He was an enemy combatant, pure and simple. We were at war, pure and simple, and his life could be taken.

But according to those who have seen it, there is a hint in the Justice Department memo that this was never a pure and simple case. We are told that one reason Justice concluded Awlaki could be killed was because he was in the wilds of Yemen and could not be captured. It seemed some thought was given to his citizenship; otherwise, why even bother to consider his capture? About 2,000 militants have been killed by drones — and not because they couldn’t be captured. They were killed not only because they deserved to be but because they could be. Former attorney general Michael B. Mukasey even suggests in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that these militants were killed because the Obama administration, having ruled out harsh interrogation, had no use for them.

The Justice Department memo and its acknowledgment of Awlaki’s citizenship are ample proof that the Obama administration realized it was crossing a line. But it did so on the sneak — a memo, still secret, written by two lawyers you and I never heard of.

We live in a soft police state. It’s not a film-noir one, based on ideology and punctuated by the crunch of hobnailed boots, but one created in response to terrorism and crime. Cameras follow us. Our travels, our purchases, are recorded. Our computers and cellphones snitch on us. There’s no Orwellian Big Brother, just countless little ones, all of them righteously on the lookout for the bad guys. It’s necessary, I suppose. It will be abused, I don’t suppose.

The American Civil Liberties Union has criticized Awlaki’s killing. But so far, the only politician of note to do so is Rep. Ron Paul, the Republican presidential candidate with a touching reverence for the Constitution as written. “Al-Awlaki was born here; he’s an American citizen. He was never tried or charged for any crimes,” he exclaimed. Paul, though, gets dismissed as a constitutional kvetch.

I do not share Paul’s indignation, but I do his dismay. Something big and possibly dangerous has happened . . . in secret. Government’s most awesome power — to take a life — has been exercised on one of its own citizens without benefit of trial. A guy named Barron and another named Lederman apparently said it was okay. Maybe it was. But I’d sure like to hear the attorney general or the president explain why.

Occupy Wall Street: The Most Important Thing in the World Now, by Naomi Klein, The Nation 06/10/2011

And there is only one thing that can block this tactic, and fortunately, it’s a very big thing: the 99 percent. And that 99 percent is taking to the streets from Madison to Madrid to say “No. We will not pay for your crisis.”

That slogan began in Italy in 2008. It ricocheted to Greece and France and Ireland and finally it has made its way to the square mile where the crisis began.

“Why are they protesting?” ask the baffled pundits on TV. Meanwhile, the rest of the world asks: “What took you so long?” “We’ve been wondering when you were going to show up.” And most of all: “Welcome.”

Many people have drawn parallels between Occupy Wall Street and the so-called anti-globalization protests that came to world attention in Seattle in 1999. That was the last time a global, youth-led, decentralized movement took direct aim at corporate power. And I am proud to have been part of what we called “the movement of movements.”

But there are important differences too. For instance, we chose summits as our targets: the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the G8. Summits are transient by their nature, they only last a week. That made us transient too. We’d appear, grab world headlines, then disappear. And in the frenzy of hyper patriotism and militarism that followed the 9/11 attacks, it was easy to sweep us away completely, at least in North America.

Occupy Wall Street, on the other hand, has chosen a fixed target. And you have put no end date on your presence here. This is wise. Only when you stay put can you grow roots. This is crucial. It is a fact of the information age that too many movements spring up like beautiful flowers but quickly die off. It’s because they don’t have roots. And they don’t have long term plans for how they are going to sustain themselves. So when storms come, they get washed away.

Being horizontal and deeply democratic is wonderful. But these principles are compatible with the hard work of building structures and institutions that are sturdy enough to weather the storms ahead. I have great faith that this will happen.

Something else this movement is doing right: You have committed yourselves to non-violence. You have refused to give the media the images of broken windows and street fights it craves so desperately. And that tremendous discipline has meant that, again and again, the story has been the disgraceful and unprovoked police brutality. Which we saw more of just last night. Meanwhile, support for this movement grows and grows. More wisdom.

But the biggest difference a decade makes is that in 1999, we were taking on capitalism at the peak of a frenzied economic boom. Unemployment was low, stock portfolios were bulging. The media was drunk on easy money. Back then it was all about start-ups, not shutdowns.

We pointed out that the deregulation behind the frenzy came at a price. It was damaging to labor standards. It was damaging to environmental standards. Corporations were becoming more powerful than governments and that was damaging to our democracies. But to be honest with you, while the good times rolled, taking on an economic system based on greed was a tough sell, at least in rich countries.

Ten years later, it seems as if there aren’t any more rich countries. Just a whole lot of rich people. People who got rich looting the public wealth and exhausting natural resources around the world.

The point is, today everyone can see that the system is deeply unjust and careening out of control. Unfettered greed has trashed the global economy. And it is trashing the natural world as well. We are overfishing our oceans, polluting our water with fracking and deepwater drilling, turning to the dirtiest forms of energy on the planet, like the Alberta tar sands. And the atmosphere cannot absorb the amount of carbon we are putting into it, creating dangerous warming. The new normal is serial disasters: economic and ecological.

These are the facts on the ground. They are so blatant, so obvious, that it is a lot easier to connect with the public than it was in 1999, and to build the movement quickly.

We all know, or at least sense, that the world is upside down: we act as if there is no end to what is actually finite—fossil fuels and the atmospheric space to absorb their emissions. And we act as if there are strict and immovable limits to what is actually bountiful—the financial resources to build the kind of society we need.

The task of our time is to turn this around: to challenge this false scarcity. To insist that we can afford to build a decent, inclusive society—while at the same time, respect the real limits to what the earth can take.

What climate change means is that we have to do this on a deadline. This time our movement cannot get distracted, divided, burned out or swept away by events. This time we have to succeed. And I’m not talking about regulating the banks and increasing taxes on the rich, though that’s important.

I am talking about changing the underlying values that govern our society. That is hard to fit into a single media-friendly demand, and it’s also hard to figure out how to do it. But it is no less urgent for being difficult.

That is what I see happening in this square. In the way you are feeding each other, keeping each other warm, sharing information freely and proving health care, meditation classes and empowerment training. My favorite sign here says, “I care about you.” In a culture that trains people to avoid each other’s gaze, to say, “Let them die,” that is a deeply radical statement.

The Fight for 'Real Democracy' at the Heart of Occupy Wall Street, by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Foreign Affairs 11/10/2011

(...) If together these different protest encampments -- from Cairo and Tel Aviv to Athens, Madison, Madrid, and now New York -- express a dissatisfaction with the existing structures of political representation, then what do they offer as an alternative? What is the "real democracy" they propose?

The clearest clues lie in the internal organization of the movements themselves -- specifically, the way the encampments experiment with new democratic practices. These movements have all developed according to what we call a "multitude form" and are characterized by frequent assemblies and participatory decision-making structures. (And it is worth recognizing in this regard that Occupy Wall Street and many of these other demonstrations also have deep roots in the globalization protest movements that stretched at least from Seattle in 1999 to Genoa in 2001.) 

Much has been made of the way social media such as Facebook and Twitter have been employed in these encampments. Such network instruments do not create the movements, of course, but they are convenient tools, because they correspond in some sense to the horizontal network structure and democratic experiments of the movements themselves. Twitter, in other words, is useful not only for announcing an event but for polling the views of a large assembly on a specific decision in real time. 

Do not wait for the encampments, then, to develop leaders or political representatives. No Martin Luther King, Jr. will emerge from the occupations of Wall Street and beyond. For better or worse -- and we are certainly among those who find this a promising development -- this emerging cycle of movements will express itself through horizontal participatory structures, without representatives. Such small-scale experiments in democratic organizing would have to be developed much further, of course, before they could articulate effective models for a social alternative, but they are already powerfully expressing the aspiration for a "real democracy." 

Confronting the crisis and seeing clearly the way it is being managed by the current political system, young people populating the various encampments are, with an unexpected maturity, beginning to pose a challenging question: If democracy -- that is, the democracy we have been given -- is staggering under the blows of the economic crisis and is powerless to assert the will and interests of the multitude, then is now perhaps the moment to consider that form of democracy obsolete?

If the forces of wealth and finance have come to dominate supposedly democratic constitutions, including the U.S. Constitution, is it not possible and even necessary today to propose and construct new constitutional figures that can open avenues to again take up the project of the pursuit of collective happiness? With such reasoning and such demands, which were already very alive in the Mediterranean and European encampments, the protests spreading from Wall Street across the United States pose the need for a new democratic constituent process.